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Abstract: Transgender communities are always considered not part of the citizenship project. The 
recent Supreme Court verdict making them very much part of the citizenshop discourse has 
considerably changed the situation. Even though these communities have found their presence 
since ancient times, yet it took such a long time to recognise their legal rights. Yet, if one closely 
look at the judgement, there are shortcomings and it needs further improvement. The most 
important drawback is that it does not address the question of their social recognition and also it 
does not address the unconventional transgender community in its analysis. It only recognises 
their legal rights.  
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The founding document on which 
most human rights organisations base their 
advocacy is the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. From this initial document 
has emerged a whole series of human rights 
declarations, conventions, treaties pertaining 
to the rights of various marginalised groups 
and communities such as children, women, 
rights of various marginalised groups and 
communities such as children, women, 
indigenous people, disabled people, 
prisoners, religious and ethnic minorities, 
refugees etc. However, one significant 
absence in international human rights law has 
been an express articulation of the specific 
interests of sexually minorities. It is only in 
the final decade of the 20th century that the 
gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender movement 
brought to the fore the rights of those 
discriminated against because of their 
sexuality. In 1991, Amnesty International for 
the first time came out with a policy to 
support the rights of people imprisoned 
because of their sexual orientation or because 
of engaging in homosexual activity in 
private. In the mid 1990’s, the Human Rights 
committee held that the anti sodomy law of 
Tasmania violated the right to privacy and 
the right to non discrimination guaranteed to 
all persons under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. In Scandinavia, 
the provision of equal rights for sexual 
minorities including marriage rights was an 
important breakthrough. The other major 
development has been the South African 
Constitution which for the first time 
expressly prohibited discriminated on 
grounds of sexual orientation.  
While the scope of human rights has been 
extended to include hitherto marginalised 
communities at the global level, a similar 
movement is yet to take place in India. In 
fact, most human rights organisations in India 
have not begun to address the question of 
rights of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, 
transgender, hijras and others who are 
oppressed due to their sexuality. Sexuality is 
sometimes viewed even in liberal and radical 
circles as a frivolous, bourgeois issue. In such 
a context, homosexuality is seen implicitly as 
something deviant and unnatural that is at 
best defended as an individual freedom but 
not a matter of priority for the human rights 
movement. Generally, issues of poverty and 
gender, class and caste oppression are seen as 
more important than that of sexuality. But 
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this ignores the fact that sexuality is 
integrally linked to ideologies and structures 
of social oppression such as patriarchy, 
capitalism, the caste system and religious 
fundamentalism. Hence the struggle for 
sexuality rights cannot be separated from the 
broader human rights struggle for economic, 
political and social liberation.  
The status of sexual minorities in India 
Homosexual orienetation is common in 
almost every culture and every society. 
However, homophobia is chiefly the product 
of Judeo-Christian morality spread to various 
parts of the world through European 
colonialism, which exported its laws and its 
morality into other contexts. It has to be 
noted that homosexuality also finds a 
mention in the various pre-colonial laws. 
Homosexuality is seen as an offence in 
Manusmrithi, which however can be 
expiated. Lesbianism by contrast merits more 
serious punishment. Islamic Shariat law treats 
homosexual conduct as a serious offence, 
though it is being argued by some recently 
formed gay Muslim organisations that 
Islamic law can be interpreted in a non-
homophobic fashion. It was with the 
enactment of uniform criminal laws in India, 
in 1860 that there was a uniform proscription 
of homosexual behaviour.  
Though sexuality minorities have always 
existed in India sometimes in forms, which 
are culturally sanctioned (such as the hijra) 
and at other times in invisibility and silence, 
their issues have never seriously been 
articulated. It is only recently that the rights 
of sexual minorities as an issue have been 
taken seriously in India by various civil 
society organisations. With the funding of 
India’s first gay magazine Bombay Dost in 
the late 1980’s and the starting of a lesbian 
collective in Delhi called Sakhi, lesbian, gay 
and bisexual issues were first articulated in a 
public forum. Since those early beginnings, 
the fledging  sexuality minority rights 
movement has grown increasingly vocal and 
articulate.  
Today, there are organisations, helplines, 
publications/newsletters, health resources, 
social spaces and drop-in-centers in most of 
the major cities in India like Delhi, Mumbai, 
Calcutta, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, 
Chennai, Patna and Lucknow. There has also 
been a branching out into smaller cities and 
towns like Akola, Trichi, Gulbarga. In spite 
of this, the support structures provided are 
painfully inadequate with few or no such 
organisations for lesbians, bisexuals and 
hijras. What is more, many of the newly 
emerging organisations die out silently while 
even the more established ones have been 
able to reach out in concrete terms only to a 
small section of the sexuality minority 
population due to lack of resources, 
personnel, government support and extreme 
societal/state discrimination. It is in these 
twin contexts of the global movement for 
recognition of sexuality minority rights and 
the increasing assertiveness of sexuality 
minority voices at the local level that the 
present argument is located. The paper has 
two broad arguments. First, the judgement of 
Supreme Court with regard to legal 
recognition of third gender is historic. 
Second, there are problems and areas of 
improvement in the Supreme Court 
judgement.  
Supreme Court Verdict on Third Gender 
The supreme court, in the National legal 
Service Authority (NALSA) judgment has 
recognized the legal and constitutional rights 
of transgender persons, including the rights 
of the hijra community as a ‘third gender’. In 
judgment of immense breadth and vision, 
Justice K.S.Radhakrishanan and A.K Sikri 
have brought hope and a promise of 
citizenship to a community that has largely 
been outside the legal framework. 
NALSA filed this petition in 2012. In 2013, 
this matter was tagged together with a 
petition filed in the Supreme Court by the 
Poojaya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji Women’s 
Welfare Society, an organization working for 
kinnars, a transgender community.  Laxmi 
Narayan Tripathi , a well-known transgender 
rights activist from Mumbai also intervened 
in this case. 
Irony of this judgment is that/ it was 
delivered just a few months after Koushal, in 
which the Supreme Court recriminalized 
LGBT persons and upheld the 
constitutionality of section 377 of the IPC. 
Transgenders as the ‘other’: The politics of Transgender community after the historic Supreme Court Verdict  
International Research Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 2(2), February, 2016  Page 3     
Email: irjms2015@gmail.com, irjms.in@gmail.com 
The court acknowledges this , but make it 
clear while it recognizes that section 377 is 
used to harass and discriminate against 
transgender persons, this judgment leaves 
Koushal undisturbed , and instead focused 
specifically on the legal recognition of the 
transgender community. 
The court relied on the definition in the 
Yogyakarta Principles and clarified the 
distinction between gender identity and 
sexual orientation. The court engages with 
both these categories, but focusing only on 
the transgender subject. Transgender is seen 
as an umbrella category that includes those 
whose identify as male to female , female to 
male , intersexed, and transsexual persons as 
well as those identify as hijras, kothis, 
kinnars , aravanis/thirunangis, jogappas/ 
jogta, shivshakthis and eunuchs. 
Significantly, the court says the term 
transgender includes ‘pre-operative, posts- 
operative, and non- operative ‘transsexuals 
who stringly identify with persons of the 
opposite sex. Thus the court’s judgment is 
not limited to post operative transsexuals, and 
the court emphasizes that to limit itself to 
such a view is unacceptable. 
There are two central questions that the Court 
addresses. The first is the recognition of a 
third gender category for hijaras or equivalent 
culture identities in order to facilitate legal 
rights. The second is that transgender 
persons, for the purpose of the law, should be 
able to identify in the gender of their choice, 
which could be male, female or a third 
gender category. In the operative part of the 
judgment, the court held that hijras and 
eunuchs be treated as “third gender” to 
safeguard their fundamental rights. The Court 
also held that and transgender persons have 
right to decide their self identified gender. 
The Court builds on a recent history of 
central and state government recognition of 
the third gender category in state social 
welfare benefits, national election 
identification cards, passport forms and the 
UID form. In making it legal blinding on 
central and state governments to begin 
moving away from a legal system based 
purely on a binary system, this judgment has 
revolutionary implications for the current 
laws related to marriage, adoption , 
inheritance , succession , welfare legislations 
like the NREGA labour law, etc, all of which 
are based on a binary classification of gender 
. 
Specifically dealing with the issue of Sex 
Reassignment Surgery (SRS), the Court relies 
on judgments from jurisdiction across the 
world to direct the government to move away 
from the now discredited Corbett test i.e. to 
move away from a biological to 
psychological evaluation of gender for 
purpose of the law.  In fact the court has held 
that insistence on SRS as a precondition for 
legal recognition is immoral and illegal. This 
will facilitate the legal recognition of all 
those who undergo an SRS, and clarify any 
existing area in the law. 
From the point of view of constitutional 
developments, the NALSA judgment is path 
breaking. The Courts rely on Article 14 (right 
to equality), 15 (right to non discrimination), 
19 (right to freedom of speech and 
expression), 21 (right to live with dignity and 
right to autonomy), Article 51(Directive 
Principle of State Policy) (fostering respect 
for international law and treaty obligation) 
and the words Justice – social, economical 
and political in the preamble to the 
Constitution. 
The right to equality in Article 14 has been 
read to apply to transgender persons 
including those whose identify as a third 
gender. The Court says that non-recognition 
of identity denies transgender persons equal 
protection of the law. In a move reminiscent 
of the Delhi High Court’s ruling in the 
NazFoundation case, the Court reads the term 
‘sex’ in the non-discrimination clauses of 
Article 15 and 16 include ‘gender identity’ ( 
In Naz, the High Court had read sex include 
sexual orientation). The Court’s does this by 
stating that the intent behind the framing of 
the term ‘sex’ in these sections was to 
prevent the direct or indirect attitude to treat 
people differently, for nor being in 
conformity with stereotypical generalizations 
of binary genders. The court held that the 
expression ‘sex’ in Article 15 and 16 is not 
limited to male or female but includes people 
who consider themselves neither male nor 
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female. The Court’s ruling prohibits 
discrimination against transgender persons in 
public spaces like hotel, public restaurants, 
roads, shops and places of public 
entertainment. 
Building on this analysis, the Court directed 
the central and State governments to take 
steps to treat transgender person as a socially 
and educationally backward class entitled to 
reservation in educational institutions and 
public appointments. It also directed the 
Central and State governments to provide 
access to healthcare for transgender persons 
is based on the prevalent juridical assumption 
that law   should target discrimination based 
on sex(i.e. whether a person is anatomically 
male or female ) rather than gender ( whether 
a person has qualities that are masculine or 
feminine). 
One of the most innovative parts of the 
judgment is the court’s reading of Article 19 
(1) a, the right to freedom of speech and 
expression to include the right to expression 
of one’s self identified gender. No person can 
be told how to dress subject to restrictions in 
Article 19(2) (which include ‘public order, 
decency and morality). This is a bold move 
and identifies the link between gender 
identity and dress, words, action and 
behaviour. This is especially important in the 
context of discrimination against transgender 
persons who challenge accepted binary forms 
dressing, and behaviour. 
In this judgment, the court builds on a long 
line of cases where the right to life has been 
recognized in claims from marginalized 
communities. The Court stressed that the 
right to life includes the right to live with 
dignity and the right to human development. 
Article 21, the court says, not only provides a 
negative right, but also places a positive 
obligation on the state to ensure that the 
transgender community is able to live with 
dignity. This can be Court observes that by 
giving force to the right to dignity guaranteed 
by the Constitution, the court is bridging the 
gap between law and life, which is the 
primary purpose of the constitution.    
A recurring theme that runs through the 
judgment is that of the idea of justice. Justice 
Sikri explains the idea of justice that 
animates the Indian Constitution as being 
influenced by Kantian categorical imperative, 
the Rawlsian notion of Justice as Fairness 
and Amartya Sen‘s idea of Distributive 
Justice. 
Another thread running through the judgment 
is that the Constitution has to keep up with 
the move from the colonial to post colonial 
dispensation. Transgender persons were 
criminalized by the British by section 377 
IPC, (1861) and an amendment to Criminal 
Tribes Act (1871). Section 377 remains on 
the statute book and the court this act that 
remains in force in the country even today. 
The court highlights the indigenous root of 
hijras culture and the rich Indian tradition of 
mythology and history with references to 
persons of the third gender. 
In stark contrast to the judges in Koushal, the 
Bench in this case relies extensively on 
international human rights principles and 
comparative law. They quote extensively    
from the Yogyakarta principle on the 
application of International Human Right 
Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (2006), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Right (1950), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), 1976, and comparative law 
from the United Kingdom, the EU, Germany, 
Argentina, South Africa, the United State, 
Hungary, Australia, Malaysia and New 
Zealand. 
The most interesting use of comparative law 
is the court’s reference to recent Supreme 
Court decisions in Pakistan ( Dr. Mohammad 
Aslam  Khaki v Sr Superintendent of police , 
Rawalpindi,2011) and Nepal ( Sunil Babu 
Pant & Ors v Nepal Government,2007) 
where these courts in these countries have 
recognized a third gender category in law. 
The judges in this case refer to the historical 
presence of a third gender in the 
subcontinent. This reference holds out the 
possibility of developing a unique South 
Asian jurisprudence on transgender rights 
that can contribute to the existing 
international human rights framework. 
Contradictions in the judgement and areas 
for improvement 
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While the ruling is in line with the tune of 
Indian constitution, the verdict does not apply 
to sexuality, leaving India’s lesbian, gay and 
bisexual communities in a state of flux. In 
fact, it contradicts a judgment made in 
December, by a different bench of the 
Supreme Court, which upheld the 
controversial section 377 of the Indian penal 
code the criminalised “sex against the order 
of nature “which is interpreted as gay sex. 
Only the ruling Congress party was quick off 
the mark to question the court ruling. 
The transgender judgment quotes from 
several testimonies, illustrating the suffering 
of transgender persons and rightly 
acknowledging the role that section 377 
played in discriminating against them. It is 
well accepted in the west that just as gender 
identity is integral to a person’s self, dignity 
and freedom, so is a person’s sexuality  . The 
result is a constitutional dilemma –a colonial 
–era law is being interpreted in a 
contradictory manner by highest court in 
India. Yet uniquely, both ruling fit in India’s 
super conservative extended family-
structured value system which is adhered to 
throughout the nation as well as the Hindu 
majority’s religious beliefs. Psyche stems 
back to the essential Hindu epic text, the 
Mahabharata, where the male Shikhandi (but 
born the female Shikhandini) was vital in 
securing the Pandavas’s necessary victory 
over Kaurava in the great war of 
Kurukshetra. 
While the Hijra are part of Indian society, 
they are still considered outsiders, being poor 
and generally working class. This makes it 
more acceptable for them to be ignored, thus 
preventing the judgment from being truly 
progressive. However, lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual Indians also stem from middle-and 
upper-class society, and are therefore more 
threatening to the conservative structure and 
value system of society not only in India but 
where Indians have settled worldwide. Only 
last week a British-Asian man was 
imprisoned for murdering his Indian –born 
wife whom he married with the wish to unite 
his homosexuality and the value system of 
his community. There are two specific 
criticisms used against NALSA judgement.  
First, in the 130-page judgment of Justices 
K.S. Radhakrishnan and A.K. Sikri, not a 
single page carried any of the following 
words: FTM (Female to Male), Transman, 
Intergender, Bhaiya, Babu, Kotha, FTK 
(Female to Kotha), Thirunambi, 
Genderqueer, Gandabasaka—some common 
terms used by members of the trans 
masculine, intersex and inter-gender 
communities for their identities and/or 
expressions. Nor did the judgement have one 
example of the extremely difficult and 
invisible lives of persons from these non-
traditional trans communities. 
Second, there is no exploring NALSA 
without going into NAZ. What needs to be 
realized is that NAZ and NALSA deal with 
two different things, that is, sexual 
orientation and gender identity, respectively. 
Thus NALSA does not by any means 
overrule NAZ. First, in the context of 
NALSA confusion arises especially given 
that Para 77 of the judgement stipulates – 
“Discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity includes any 
discrimination, exclusion, restriction or 
preference, which has the effect of nullifying 
or transposing equality by the law or the 
equal protection of laws guaranteed under our 
Constitution, and hence we are inclined to 
give various directions to safeguard the 
constitutional rights of the members of the 
TG community.” However, there is a need to 
read this statement in context of NALSA 
judgement, that is, extension of citizenship 
rights to members of the trans-community. 
This can be illustrated using an example. A 
transman who does not undergo sexual 
reassignment surgery (SRS) and continues to 
retain the biological body of a woman cannot 
be criminalized for engaging in sexual 
activity with a cisgender (or trans) woman 
because by the virtue of his gender identity 
such an act would be viewed as being 
heterosexual sex. However a conflict may 
arise in the following case: Could a transman 
who does not undergo SRS and continues to 
retain the biological body of a woman be 
criminalized under Section 377 of the Indian 
Penal Code if he has consensual sex with a 
cisgender man, because in such event 
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because of his gender identity such an act 
would be viewed as homosexual sex. Thus in 
spite of dealing with a different issue as 
compared from NAZ, the shadow of NAZ 
continues to extend over NALSA. As argued 
by Danish Sheikh, one cannot overlook 
historical reality wherein the transgender 
community has always been identified with 
sexual acts committed under Section 377.1 
He goes on to argue – “The full moral 
citizenship that NALSA grants can only be 
rendered such when it is accompanied by the 
sexual citizenship that the Koushal Court has 
taken away.”2 Second, though the right to 
gender identity is recognized in law, the issue 
that arises is how far will a society, including 
legal authorities, which continues to remain 
in the dark as far as issues of gender and 
sexuality are concerned, view what in law is 
legitimate (Illustration #1) as normative and 
thus acceptable sexual expression? The 
underlying conflict between the two 
judgements in terms of the intrinsic nexus 
between gender identity and sexual 
orientation and society’s ignorance and 
hetero-normative outlook leaves the members 
of the trans-community in a flummoxed state 
when it comes to determining which sexual 
expressions are legitimate or illegitimate.
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